Autonomy and Australian Air Power

1. Introduction

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) today faces a force design dilemma that it shares with all modern militaries – how to integrate uncrewed systems with differing levels of autonomy into force structures and operating concepts. The proliferation of uncrewed systems in recent conflicts has led analysts to draw often-conflicting conclusions on their effectiveness and utility in modern warfare, as well as how best to structure and operate a force of crewed and uncrewed platforms.

The air domain is no stranger to this dilemma caused by emergent technology, where force design based on analysis drawn from previous conflicts often has unanticipated outcomes. This is particularly true when the nature of conflict and the technology path differ from what was envisioned, as was found (and still debated) with concepts such as strategic bombing in World War II. The initial performance of an Air Force in a crisis or conflict is often determined by how well the nature of the conflict, and the development of the technology, are understood and anticipated, and how well the force can rapidly adapt.

This paper explores the employment of uncrewed and autonomous systems in Australia’s air domain through the lens of our unique strategic context, including geography, demography and strategic objectives. This paper will explain how Australia’s geography and demographic realities make autonomous systems, particularly Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (ACPs), essential to delivering effective national air power within its broader defence strategy, enabling significant capability advantages when combined with emerging concepts such as Agile Combat Employment (ACE) as well as offering the potential for rapid capability expansion in the event of crisis or conflict.

2. Australia’s strategic context

2.1. Strategic guidance

At the outbreak of World War II, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) had approximately 250 aircraft – only slightly less than that are in service today, although the relative quality and capability of today’s Air Force is significantly greater. The 1939 permanent Air Force had approximately 3,100 personnel from Australia’s population of 7 million (0.05%) (Gillison, 1962, pp. 55–57). By 1944 the Air Force had reached over 182,000 personnel (2.5% of the population) and over 6,200 aircraft (Australian War Memorial, 2025). The personnel strength and number of platforms figures represent the force design decisions of a government at the extreme ends of the spectrum of warfare, and are a useful guide when framing the problem space for 2026. Of interest, today’s Air Force numbers once again are close to 0.05% of the population, a similar proportion to 1939.

At first glance, a RAAF with over 6,000 aircraft seems far beyond the needs and capacity of Australia in 2026. A comparison of the Air Force’s activities in 1944 with the expectations of the Government in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), however, reveals many similarities. All the major roles of the Air Force in 1944 could be captured with the NDS five tasks, namely:

• Defend Australia and our immediate region;

• Deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;

• Protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;

• Contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and

• Contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order. (Department of Defence, 2024, p. 25)

Naturally this does not mean Air Force should immediately seek to replicate its 1944 size and capability – much has changed in Australia politically, economically, socially and militarily since 1944 and such a force would be difficult to justify and sustain. These figures, however, should be considered a target in the event of escalation should Australia once again be involved with a great power conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and although Australia has evolved significantly as a nation since 1944, its geography remains unchanged.

2.2. Geography

There are two geographical frames to consider in this analysis: the first is Australia’s own geography, including its distribution of population and infrastructure, with the second frame the geographic area described in the NDS as the primary area of military interest. The NDS defines this area as ‘the immediate region encompassing the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific. This region includes our northern approaches’ (Department of Defence, 2024, p. 21). The NDS goes on to state that this area should be the focus of the ‘Government’s defence strategy, capability plans and resources’ (Department of Defence, 2024, p. 22) where the ADF should be able to project and sustain deployed forces, as well as maintain a high level of situational awareness.

These two geographic frames are vast and critical to understanding Australia’s strategic context:

• The primary area of military interest defines the Government’s expectation of the areas and distances at which the ADF may have to project force in support of the five tasks.

• Australia’s geography defines the operating bases and means from which this force is generated and sustained.

For example, threats to shipping, critical to Australia’s economic connection and the third ADF task in the NDS, may occur at many locations throughout the primary area of military interest, many thousands of kilometres from Australia’s population centres or even forward operating bases. For task two (deterring through denial), existing and emerging long-range weapon systems allow potential adversaries to project power against Australia from distances throughout the defined area and beyond. The ADF and Air Force must be able to generate sufficient combat mass to deter, shape and respond to these threats, and the ability to generate this combat mass at range remains one of the key challenges for Defence force designers and planners.

The ADF’s Air Domain Concept ASPECT clearly articulates the challenge in Australia’s geographical frame:

Despite a vast territorial landmass and surrounding geographic areas of interest, Australia is one of the world’s most sparsely populated countries … The population is concentrated in urban areas, particularly on the eastern, south-eastern and southern seaboards … ADF force generation sites and the national support base, essential for ADF support and sustainment, are also concentrated in these population centres. (Department of Defence, 2025, p. 3)

Many Australian force design decisions, including the development of the RAAF bare bases in northern Australia and most recently the MQ-4C Triton and AUKUS conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine programs have been influenced by this reality. Australia has developed an enviable expeditionary capability as a necessity, however, the sheer size of the country and primary area of military interest challenges the ADF’s reach and logistics capability. For Air Force in particular, the decision to seek qualitative superiority has resulted in a force structure consisting of a relatively small number of high capability platforms, many which come with a significant support and basing overhead. Air Force’s small number of platforms can generate significant air power effects but only over an area constrained by platform, sensor and weapon range, logistics capability and personnel numbers. Rapid expansion to a much larger order of battle of similar types of aircraft would be difficult for a country with a large area and modest population such as Australia. The increased number of operational and support crews required would challenge Air Force’s ability to recruit and train sufficient personnel. This tension between geography (distance) and demography (population) remains one of the key challenges for force design in Australia and for the RAAF.

2.3. Combat mass

Another key challenge that needs to be considered in Australia’s strategic context is the combat mass required against potential adversaries. Deterring or defeating a more capable adversary requires a greater combat mass to minimise risk or avoid unacceptable loss of platforms and personnel. Australia’s demography again comes into play here – a country with a small population is less able to accept losses of aircraft and trained personnel in conflict, particularly with a small number of complex systems that require specialised training and qualifications. Concept ASPECT acknowledges that ‘Australia now faces potential adversaries with advantages in scale, technology and economic weight …These actors have developed potent capabilities designed to counter how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) develops, employs and sustains air power’ (Department of Defence, 2025, p. 7). The ability to generate combat mass over the primary area of military interest while concurrently protecting and preserving capability is an additional dilemma for the ADF and Air Force.

2.4. Allies and partners

The final aspect of Australia’s strategic context in this brief examination is the impact of allies and partners. The NDS emphasises that ‘Australia’s Alliance with the US is fundamental to our national security and the ADF’s capacity to generate, sustain and project credible military capability’ (Department of Defence, 2024, p. 46). The NDS also notes the importance of strengthening engagement with the US for acquisition of technology and capability as well as to ‘drive interoperability and interchangeability in the development of the ADF’s force structure’ (Department of Defence, 2024, p. 46). The need for interoperability with the US requires that the ADF’s crewed and uncrewed systems must be able to operate together effectively with similar allied forces, both technically and procedurally. Interoperability is strong with current capabilities in service, and must be a key consideration for future acquisitions, particularly with sovereign systems designed and manufactured in Australia. Australia cannot afford to fall behind its allies and partners in any aspect of its order of battle, with trust being a key consideration for coalition operations with uncrewed systems.

This strategic context, including geography, demography, and allied and adversary considerations, presents a force design dilemma for the ADF and Air Force, for which uncrewed and autonomous systems have been frequently called for as a solution. The use of these systems in the Australian strategic context will be explored in the next section of this paper.

3. Understanding uncrewed and autonomous systems in Australia’s strategic context

3.1. Terminology

Terminology for uncrewed and autonomous systems in the air domain has been constantly evolving with different services, nations, coalitions and industry favouring different terms. This section will explore the key terms currently used in Australia, namely Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (ACPs), and Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs).

Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (ACPs) is a term favoured by UK and NATO doctrine, with the following ACP definition from the Royal Air Force Autonomous Collaborative Platform Strategy:

A series of uncrewed vehicles which demonstrate autonomous behaviour and are able to operate in a collaborative manner with other assets. (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2024, p. 15)

The UK definition is supported by the NATO definition of autonomy:

A system’s ability to function, within parameters established by programming and without outside intervention, in accordance with desired goals, based on acquired knowledge and an evolving situational awareness. (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2024, p. 16)

The current ADF definition of ACP is less prescriptive: ‘Any uncrewed vehicle that is primarily controlled by on board autonomy and/or artificial intelligence software systems’ (Department of Defence, 2025, p. 33). The distinction between the two definitions is subtle and reflects the source documents, however, it is important to note that neither definition requires an ACP to be fully autonomous – ‘demonstrat[ing] autonomous behaviour’ (UK) and ‘primarily controlled by on board autonomy’ (ADF).

These definitions allow for different levels of autonomy, a key concept to consider when integrating uncrewed systems into force structures and operating concepts. There are currently no categories for autonomy in the air domain defined in ADF doctrine, so it is useful to consider the international industry standard categorisation from the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS). Automation Levels for Unmanned Aerial Systems from the JARUS Methodology for Evaluation of Automation for UAS Operations are summarised in Table 1.

Commanders in any domain must have an effective understanding of these levels and their operational implications when employing a force of uncrewed and crewed systems. Similarly, an agreed framework for defining the levels of autonomy within the ADF and Australian Government, as well as with allied and partner forces, is critical in developing integrated policy, operational procedures and risk management activities prior to the employment of these systems.

There are numerous other criteria currently used to classify uncrewed and autonomous systems including by size, mission and type of propulsion. From the force design perspective, it is useful to also categorise uncrewed systems in terms of their expected survivability and expendability. The RAF proposes the following tier system for ACPs:

• Tier 1 disposable. ACP with a life-cycle of one or very few missions.

• Tier 2 attritable. ACP that are expected to survive the mission, but losses are acceptable.

• Tier 3 survivable. ACP of high or strategic value; their loss would significantly affect how the RAF will fight. (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2024, p. 5)

Both the level of autonomy and the ACP tier have a significant impact on the design, production and cost of uncrewed platforms, as well as how they are best integrated with existing and future systems in a multi-domain force.

Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The other commonly used term in the autonomous system discourse is Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), a term more favoured in the US that is yet to have a formal definition in ADF or allied doctrine. CCAs are ‘large uncrewed aircraft (UAS) powered by jet engines’ and designed to operate with ‘new and existing crewed fighter jets to enhance operations in contested airspace’ (DiMascio, 2025). An Australian definition may differ from this as the concept is further developed in the ADF. CCAs may be considered a subclass of ACPs with Collaborative Reconnaissance Aircraft, Collaborative Bomber Aircraft, Collaborative Mobility Aircraft and Collaborative Training Aircraft. (Anderson, 2025) The MQ-28A Ghost Bat is considered a CCA.

3.2. Key considerations for autonomy

Two key considerations for autonomy in the force design context can be derived from these definitions and categorisations.

The first consideration is that autonomy is not only a function of the hardware and software on the platform, but how it is employed. Systems which may be capable of Level 5 Full Automation may be employed in a Level 1 mode if required by the mission, risk assessment and/or rules of engagement. Similarly, the hardware, software and, critically, the test and evaluation requirements required for an autonomous decoy are significantly less than for an air combat or strike platform. This in turn drives the cost and speed to capability, critical in the event of rapid escalation or adaption. Force designers need to be able to assess the relative values of large numbers of low-end and single-role systems against high-end and/or multi-role systems in the likely scenarios and operating environments.

The second consideration is the balance between systems that are remotely operated and autonomous. Remotely piloted aircraft that are directly controlled by an operator are generally simpler and cheaper as they do not require the software and hardware that enable system autonomy. These aircraft should be also considered in the force structure but have two main disadvantages in the Australian context. Remote operation requires secure communication links that can be difficult to maintain over the extreme ranges and are vulnerable to compromise by adversary action. Additionally, autonomous systems require fewer personnel to operate as they approach Level 4 and 5 in the JARUS framework, making them suitable for an Air Force with fewer personnel. This saving could only be realised, however, if the system autonomy is suitably trusted and meets the appropriate legal and ethical requirements for a given mission and objective.

4. The importance of autonomy in the Australian strategic context

4.1. Key advantages of autonomy

On 8 December 2025, a RAAF MQ-28A Ghost Bat successfully launched an Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) against an airborne jet target for the first time. Following the launch, the Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, noted:

[The MQ-28A] will provide three things. It’s going to give us the combat mass to contribute further to the integrated forces strategy of denial. It’s going to give us enhanced lethality of our crewed platforms. And it’s going to give us enhanced survivability of our crewed platforms as well. So, a real force multiplier and combat mass in a way that we haven’t previously had in the Royal Australian Air Force. (Conroy et al., 2025)

This effectively captures the key effects CCAs have in the battlespace and highlights the value of ACPs in achieving the objectives in the National Defence Strategy. The key CCA advantages of mass and increased lethality and survivability are an effective response to many of the issues highlighted in the previous section, particularly regarding combat mass and survivability of complex combat platforms and personnel. These are not the only attributes of ACPs and CCAs that make them highly suited for Australia’s strategic context. The following paragraphs will briefly summarise other key reasons why this technology should be part of the Air Force’s order of battle.

4.2. Range and endurance

The key advantage that ACPs have when considering the extreme distances in the primary area of military interest is range and endurance. ACPs are not limited by human crews and can remain airborne as long as they have sufficient fuel and munitions. ACPs also have the potential to be less reliant on infrastructure than current crewed systems and may be easier to store and deploy. Disposable and attritable ACPs will have greater range and endurance than platforms that will need to be safely recovered and would be a new operating paradigm for the Air Force.

4.3. Agile combat employment

An advantage of ACPs – linked to their reduced reliance on infrastructure – is the potential for Agile Combat Employment (ACE). ACE is an emerging US Air Force operating concept that ‘shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders’ (U.S. Air Force, 2022, pp. 3–4). The concept is designed to increase survivability and reduce the effectiveness of enemy targeting by moving aircraft away from vulnerable main operating bases. This agile approach to operations is highly suited for Australia’s northern geography and force structure (Chappell, 2025), with the RAAF exercising the concept since 2023. ACE introduces additional logistics, personnel and command and control requirements that may be difficult to address with complex systems such as the F-35A. ACPs, however, particularly those specifically designed for distributed operations, can generate sustained combat mass in a threat environment using ACE, with survivability enhanced though effective dispersal and deception.

4.4. Cost

A core objective of ACP and CCA programs is reduced cost when compared with conventional crewed platforms – the MQ-28A goal is to cost 10% of a crewed combat aircraft (Conroy et al., 2025). This allows more platforms to be acquired and further increase combat mass, resilience and combat depth. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) special report Aligning for advantage: Integrating autonomous systems into the Australian Defence Force concludes:

A mix of large numbers of low-cost autonomous systems to provide mass, together with an ability to collaborate and team with higher end autonomous and uncrewed systems and traditional crewed platforms, needs to be the goal of ADF policy in the acquisition of future autonomous capability. Defence’s focus on high-end platforms, such as the Ghost Bat and Ghost Shark, is relevant and important, but it needs to be complemented by the acquisition of larger numbers of lower cost autonomous systems. (Davis, 2025, p. 15)

This is further supported by the ‘heterogeneous air power model’ as proposed by Layton (Layton, 2025).

The lower cost systems mentioned in the ASPI report are not necessarily less capable, and the cost of autonomous systems can be reduced if single-role systems are considered as well as multi-role platforms. Conventional combat aircraft such as the F-35 must be multi-role due to their large cost and support requirements, however, savings may be made with single-role ACPs such as decoys, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems and Collaborative Transport Aircraft. The level of autonomy, and hence software and sensor requirements, may be less in these roles, reducing cost and complexity and allowing for a larger number of systems. A coordinated effort among allies to develop and test different types of single-role ACPs could also reduce costs across several platforms.

4.5. Sovereign manufacturing and adaptation

A key lesson from the MQ-28A program is that ACP capabilities can be designed and built in Australia. Sovereign industrial capability is a core objective of the NDS, which notes:

A sovereign defence industrial base is vital for developing higher levels of military preparedness and self-reliance. It also accelerates innovation and capability delivery. (Department of Defence, 2024, p. 57).

The importance of rapid innovation and adaption is one of the key lessons from the Ukraine conflict (Molloy, 2024, pp. 57–64). A sovereign ACP manufacturing capability supports adaptation and innovation as well as providing a resilient supply chain, with the potential for export opportunities. Developing this capability in Australia may be easier if priority is given initially to less complex single-role ACPs mentioned in the previous section.

4.6. Potential for rapid force expansion

The final advantage of autonomy in Australia air power is the potential for rapid expansion in the event of crisis or conflict. ACPs can be rapidly manufactured if the sovereign or allied supply chains and infrastructure are in place, and do not require the proportionate increase in personnel and training. This is critical in two areas: Australia’s relatively small population would be stretched in the event of a major conflict and ACPs offer the potential of a significant capability increase for a lower personnel cost. Additionally, it is expected an adversary would have drawn similar conclusions from previous conflicts and would be fielding large numbers of autonomous platforms – this would require a proportionate response from the ADF with counter-ACP systems, which may also be in fact ACPs themselves.

5. Conclusion

Australia’s National Defence Strategy requires an ADF and Air Force that can generate combat mass at range over a large geographic area from a support base limited by geography and demography. The characteristics of Autonomous Collaborative Platforms make them highly suitable in the Australian environment when operated in conjunction with existing and future crewed ADF systems using innovating operating concepts such as Agile Combat Employment. Australia should seek to develop a sovereign ACP manufacturing and innovation capability, incorporating not only highly capable multi-role Collaborative Combat Aircraft such as the MQ-28A, but also large numbers of lower-cost systems that may be single role and/or disposable or attritable.

A future Air Force integrating both crewed and uncrewed platforms, with a mix of high-end and low-cost systems collaborating with each other and allied systems, could rapidly reach the level of capability reminiscent of the Service at its peak in 1944. This would provide a range of highly responsive and operationally relevant options for the ADF and Australian Government across the spectrum of operations in peacetime, competition, crisis and conflict.